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Court of Appeals, impliedly pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
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3(2) (k) . The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the instant 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (k) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1 Whether the trial court, after granting appointed trial 
counsel 's Motion to Withdraw' erred by failing to appoint counsel to 
represent Defendant during the May 23, 1995, Sentencing Hearing. The 
trial court's failure to appoint counsel is a legal determination, 
based on constitutional and legal principles, and therefore is 
reviewed for correction of error. Cf. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 
940-41 (Utah 1994) (whether a defendant validly waived his or her 
Miranda rights is a question of law reviewed for correct of error); 
State Richardson. \ .8 (Utah App. 1992) (trial 
court's interpretation of binding case law presents question of law 
that is reviewed for correctness); State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 
1270-71 & n.ll (Utah 1993) (trial court's determination of whether 
consent to search is voluntary is question of law that is reviewed 
for correction of error) ; State i; ; Ma be, 864 P. 2d 890, 892 (Utah 
1993) (ultimate legal determination of whether a confession is 
voluntary is conclusion of la\ ,, reviewed for correctness) . 
This issue was not raised before the trial court. However, this 
case presents exceptional circumstances and/or circumstances 
5 
constituting plain error. See State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 
922-23 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah 
1987), on subsequent appeal, 779 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1989). 
2 . Whether the trial court abused its discretion in the course 
of sentencing Defendant. As set forth in State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 
1133, 1135 (Utah 1989), "An appellate court will set aside a sentence 
imposed by the trial court" (1) "if the sentence represents an abuse 
of discretion, see State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978)"; 
(2) "if the trial judge fails to consider all legally relevant 
factors, see State v. Holland, 111 P.2d 1019, (Utah 1989)"; or (3) 
"if the sentence imposed exceeds the limits prescribed by law. State 
v. Shelby, 728 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah 1986)." This issue was preserved 
in the trial court by trial counsel's request that the trial court 
utilize the option of an inpatient treatment program or halfway house 
rather than incarceration (R. 64-66, Transcript of July 25, 1995, 
Sentencing Hearing). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
U.S. Const. amend VI 14 
Utah Const. art. I, § 12 14 
See case law cited above in passim 
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The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and 
regulations, whose interpretation is determinative, are set out 
verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body and arguments of 
the instant Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
By information, Defendant, Jesse Marie Martinez, was charged 
with Aggravated Robbery, a First Degree Felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-301(1), Aggravated Kidnaping, a First Degree Felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302(1)(b)(c), and Possession of 
a Controlled Substance, a Felony of the Third Degree, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (2) (a) (I) . On February 24, 1995, the 
Honorable Michael G. Allphin, Second Circuit Court, bound Defendant 
over to the district court. 
On March 21, 1995, Defendant appeared before the district court 
for arraignment and pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, on April 11, 
1995, Defendant appeared with appointed trial counsel, Mr. William J. 
Albright, for Pretrial Hearing before the district court and entered 
a guilty plea to only Aggravated Robbery, a First Degree Felony 
pursuant to plea negotiation. In accordance with the plea 
negotiation, all other charges were dismissed. 
On May 23, 1995, Defendant appeared with appointed trial counsel 
for Sentencing. During the Sentencing Hearing, Defendant's appointed 
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trial counsel, Mr. Albright, interrupted and informed the trial court 
that Defendant had filed a bar complaint against him. Defendant's 
counsel then made a "formal motion" to withdraw as Defendant's 
counsel. The trial court granted the motion to withdraw and informed 
Defendant that "this is the time set for sentencing" and, as part of 
the sentencing, then "sentenced Defendant to the Department of 
Corrections for a 60-day evaluation. 
On July 25, 1995, Defendant appeared with new appointed counsel, 
Mr. Don S. Redd, for another sentencing hearing, at which time the 
trial court sentenced Defendant to an indeterminate term of five 
years to life at the Utah State Prison,a fine of $1250.00, plus an 
8 5% surcharge. The trial court's Sentence was entered on July 26, 
1995, and Judgment was entered on August 16, 1995. Defendant filed 
Notice of Appeal on August 25, 1995. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On February 8, 1995, Defendant and E.M. went to the 
apartment of Russell Young to collect monies claimed to have been 
owed to them (R. 41, lines 11-15, Transcript of April 11, 1995, 
Pretrial Hearing); 
2. When Mr. Young indicated that he did not have the money, 
Defendant and E.M. demanded the money again, and, in the process, 
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Mr. Young saw a gun that was in Defendant's pocket (R. 42, lines 6-8, 
Transcript of April 11, 1995, Pretrial Hearing); 
3. Thereafter, by information, Defendant was charged with 
Aggravated Robbery, a First Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-301(1), Aggravated Kidnaping, a First Degree Felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302(1)(b)(c), and Possession of a 
Controlled Substance, a Felony of the Third Degree, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(I) (R. 10-12, Information); 
4. On March 21, 1995, Defendant appeared before the district 
court for arraignment and pleaded not guilty (R. 13, Minute Entry); 
5. Pursuant to a plea negotiation, Defendant, on April 11, 
1995, appeared with appointed trial counsel, Mr. William J. Albright, 
for Pretrial Hearing before the district court and entered a guilty 
plea to only Aggravated Robbery, a First Degree Felony. All other 
charges were dismissed (R. 36-45, Transcript of April 11, 1995, 
Pretrial Hearing); 
6. On May 23, 1995, Defendant appeared with appointed trial 
counsel for Sentencing (R. 46, Transcript of May 23, 1995, Sentencing 
Hearing); 
7. At the Sentencing Hearing on May 23, 1995, the following 
exchange took place: 
MR, ALBRIGHT: Your honor, if I may. 
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THE COURT: Let me tell you what I'm willing to do in 
this case. Having reviewed this, send her down to 
diagnostic and have an evaluation before commitment to 
the prison to determine if that's appropriate or if 
there's other programs. 
MR. ALBRIGHT: Your honor, before we go further, in 
talking with Miss Martinez, she has informed me that 
she has filed a complaint at the bar against myself. 
Based on that, I cannot represent her. Obviously 
that's a conflict. Mr. Cella represents the co-
defendant in this matter and so is unable to handle 
the sentencing as well. I've talked with Mel Wilson 
today and Don Redd is the attorney that will now 
handle conflict cases. So we need her --. 
THE COURT: But I'm not going to release her today. 
I'm not going to release her while we wait. 
MR. ALBRIGHT: J can't represent her and I'm not 
representing her at this time. As I said, she just 
let me know today after we took the break. So -- and 
I have given her copies of the report. She has it in 
her possession right now. And for the record, also 
today was the first time that she informed me that she 
wanted to change her plea. And as I put on the record 
earlier, I notified her that she did miss the 30 days. 
That she had missed the 3 0 days today. I've not 
received any phone messages from Miss Martinez since 
April when we were here and today's the first time 
I've had that information given to me. So my feeling 
is that Don Redd needs to be informed that he's going 
to be representing her and she needs to take the 
presentence report that she has or he needs to acquire 
one before she is sentenced. 
J make a formal motion at this time to withdraw 
from the case on the conflict that I have on the 
record. 
THE COURT: Okay, the court will grant your motion. 
MS. MARTINEZ: I did try calling him. He did call me 
back collect. And I did call him back again and left 
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a message. I told him, please call me. Please do not 
call me back collect. He never did call me back. 
MR. ALBRIGHT: That was another matter. She didn't 
bring up anything about the appeal. That involved --
she didn't want to come to court for sentencing. She 
wanted a continuance. Is that right? 
MS. MARTINEZ: Yes. I also didn't -- wanted to speak 
to you somemore. 
MR. ALBRIGHT: I didn't talk to her any more [sic]. 
I talked to your clerk and your clerk had talked to 
her and told [sic] that she was to come to court. So 
there was nothing for me to discuss on that subject. 
She phoned me, as she did state. However, I did talk 
to her on that day. We did communicate. 
THE COURT: Ms. Martinez, this is the time set for 
sentencing. The recommendation is that you be 
sentenced to the Utah State Prison five years to life. 
I believe that I do need more information and what I'm 
proposing is sentence [sic] you to the Department of 
Corrections for a 60-day evaluation. In the 
evaluation they determine your background and make a 
recommendation if you should -- if I should follow the 
recommendation or that you should be in some 
alternative program. 
MS. MARTINEZ: Do I have to go to jail today? 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MS. MARTINEZ: You can't give me a couple of days to 
get things straightened out with my children, get 
things put away? 
THE COURT: No, and the circumstances I'm concerned 
about, whether you'd be there --. 
MS. MARTINEZ: I also have --my mother is also dying. 
They don't give her very much time to live. I'll be 
back. I'll do my time. I know I did a crime. 
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THE COURT: Well, I'm really concerned about potential 
risk of not being there, given the circumstances and 
therefore, I'm going to order you --. 
MR. CAMPAS: You Honor --
THE COURT: State you name. 
MR • CAMPAS: Edward Campas. I'm her brother. And 
your Honor, I'm the one who told her to file the 
grievance against Mr. Albright because he has been 
prejudiced against this. He has asked -- she has 
asked him not to represent her. 
MR. ALBRIGHT: Then she went ahead and had me 
represent her. I object to him bringing anything up 
that's not been filed with the court at this time. 
The court has nothing to do with that. 
THE COURT: If you want to address the issue of 
sentencing, that's the issue. 
MR. CAMPAS: I will guarantee she'll come back. 
THE COURT: Well, if she comes back you are going to 
have I think circumstances. . . . 
(R. 46-51, Transcript of May 23, 1995, Sentencing Hearing) (Emphasis 
Added)/ 
8. That same day, the trial court signed an Order for 60 Day 
Evaluation, which states in relevant part: 
This matter came before the Court for 
pronouncement of sentence on May 23, 1995. 
Plaintiff appeared by through Carvel R. Harward, 
county Attorney for Davis County. Defendant 
appeared in person and by his attorney, Don Redd 
[sic] . . . . 
There being no legal reason presented to 
the Court why judgment should not be pronounced, 
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and it appearing to the Court that imprisonment 
may be appropriate in this case, but more 
detailed information is desirable as a basis for 
determining the final sentence, than has been 
provided by a presentence report. . . . 
(R. 22, Order for 60 Day Evaluation) (Emphasis Added). Contrary to 
the trial court's Order, Defendant initially appeared at the 
Sentencing Hearing on May 23, 1995, with appointed trial counsel, 
William J. Albright, and then, after the trial court granted 
appointed counsel's Motion to Withdraw, Defendant appeared pro se for 
the remainder of the Sentencing Hearing (R. 46-50, Transcript of May 
23, 1995, Sentencing Hearing). Defendant did not appear and was not 
represented by subsequently appointed trial counsel, Mr. Don S. Redd, 
until the second Sentencing Hearing on July 25, 1995 (R. 63-64, 
Transcript of July 25, 1995, Sentencing Hearing; R. 24, Minute 
Entry); 
9. On July 25, 1995, Defendant appeared with subsequently 
appointed trial counsel, Mr. Don S. Redd, at the second Sentencing 
Hearing (R. 63-64, Transcript of July 25, 1995, Sentencing Hearing; 
R. 24, Minute Entry). At the hearing, counsel informed the trial 
court that, in the course of the evaluation, applications had been 
made by the Division of Corrections on behalf of Defendant to various 
programs to assist Defendant with alcohol and drug abuse (R. 64-65, 
Transcript of July 25, 1995, Sentencing Hearing). In the process, 
13 
counsel advised the trial court that the Parkview treatment facility 
had accepted Defendant into the an inpatient treatment program, which 
would allow the court to maintain supervision over Defendant (R. 64-
65, Transcript of July 25, 1995, Sentencing Hearing). In addition, 
trial counsel informed the trial court of the discrepancy concerning 
whether Defendant had pulled and pointed the gun on the victim (R. 
66-67, Transcript of July 25, 1995, Sentencing Hearing); 
10. The trial court sentenced Defendant to the Utah State 
Prison for an indeterminate period of five years to life; a $1250.00 
fine; plus an 85% surcharge (R. 66, lines 2-6, Transcript of July 25, 
1995, Sentencing Hearing); 
11. The trial court's Sentence was entered on July 26, 1995 (R. 
25-26, Sentence); 
12. The trial court signed its Judgment on August 10, 1995, 
which was entered on August 16, 1995 (R. 29-31, Judgment); 
13. Defendant filed Notice of Appeal on August 25, 1995 (R. 32, 
Notice of Appeal). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The trial court violated Defendant's constitutional right 
to the effective assistance of counsel by failing to appoint new 
counsel to represent Defendant during the remainder of the Sentencing 
14 
Hearing on May 23, 1995, a critical stage in the criminal 
proceedings. By so doing, the trial court required Defendant to 
involuntarily appear pro se during the Sentencing Hearing. Because 
of the trial court's failure to appoint new counsel, Defendant was 
deprived of her constitutional right to an advocate who could have 
marshaled commendations and arguments in mitigation of the impending 
sentence that was imposed. Finally, the trial court's failure to 
appoint new counsel casts doubt of the procedural fairness and the 
public's sense of fair play that is to be provided to all criminal 
defendants in criminal proceedings. 
This issue is raised for the first time on appeal. However, the 
underlying circumstances of the issue constitute plain error and/or 
exceptional circumstances. 
2. The trial court abused its discretion in the course of 
sentencing Defendant by its manifestly and inherently unfair conduct 
of failing to appoint new counsel to represent during the remainder 
of the Sentencing Hearing on May 23, 1995. In addition, the trial 
court, in the course of sentencing Defendant, failed to consider 
legally relevant factors and failed to resolve discrepancies in the 
Presentence Investigation Report. 
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ARGUMENTS 
1. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY 
FAILING TO APPOINT NEW COUNSEL TO REPRESENT DEFENDANT 
DURING THE MAY 23, 1995, SENTENCING HEARING, AND 
THEREBY REQUIRING DEFENDANT TO INVOLUNTARILY APPEAR 
PRO SE AT THE SENTENCING HEARING. 
As a matter of well-settled law, "[a] defendant in a criminal 
proceeding has a constitutional right to the assistance of counsel at 
all critical stages of the prosecution." U.S. Const, amend. VI; 1 
Utah Const, art. I, § 12;2 Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6 (1) (a) ;3 State v. 
Hamilton, 732 P.2d 505, 506-07 (Utah 1986) (per curiam); State v. 
Gray, 601 P.2d 918 (Utah 1979). "Sentencing is a critical stage of 
a criminal proceeding at which a defendant is entitled to the 
effective assistance of counsel." State v. Caserez, 656 P.2d 1005, 
1007 (Utah 1982) (citing Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S.Ct. 254 
(1967); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 87 S.Ct. 1209 (1967); and 
Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 756, 68 S.Ct. 1252 (1948)). The right to 
assistance of counsel "is personal in nature and may be waived by a 
xThe Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: 
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to 
. . . have the Assistance of counsel for his defence." 
2Article I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution provides: "In criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel . . . ." 
3Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6(1) (a) provides: "In criminal 
prosecutions the defendant is entitled: To appear in person and 
defend in person or by counsel." 
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competent accused [only] if the waiver is knowingly and 
intelligently' made." State v. Frampton, 737 P. 2d 183, 187 (Utah 
1987); see also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37, 92 S. Ct. 
2006, 2012 (1972); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65, 58 S.Ct. 
1019, 1023 (1938); State v. Ruple, 631 P.2d 874, 875-76 (Utah 1981); 
State v. Wilson, 563 P.2d 792, 793-94 (Utah 1977) . A knowing and 
intelligent waiver is required because xx [w] hen an accused manages 
[her] own defense, [s]he relinquishes, as a purely factual matter, 
many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to 
counsel." Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541. Furthermore, 
the violation of the constitutional right to counsel cannot be 
considered harmless error. See State v. Gutierrez, 864 P. 2d 894, 898 
n.4 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, 1109 (Utah 
App. 1990), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991), cert, denied, 
U.S. , 112 S.Ct. 1282 (1992); Cf. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 
168, 177 n.8, 104 S.Ct. 944, 950 n.8 (1984) ("Since the right of 
self-representation is a right that when exercised usually increases 
the likelihood of a trial outcome unfavorable to the defendant, its 
denial is not amenable to "harmless error" analysis. The right is 
either respected or denied; its deprivation cannot be harmless"). 
This issue of whether the trial court erred in failing to 
appoint Defendant counsel is raised for the first time on appeal. 
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Ordinarily, the failure to raise an issue before the trial court 
precludes consideration of the issue on appeal. State v. Jennings, 
875 P.2d 566, 570 (Utah App. 1994). There are, however, two limited 
but well-established exceptions to this general rule. State v. 
Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1991). The appellate court 
may address an issue for the first time on appeal if the trial court 
committed plain error or there are exceptional circumstances. Id. 
In State v. Eldredge, 113 P.2d 29 (Utah), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 
814, 110 S.Ct. 62 (1989), the Utah Supreme Court outlined the 
following principles involved in determining whether "plain error'7 
exists: 
The first requirement for a finding of plain 
error is that the error be "plain," i.e., from 
our examination of the record, we must be able 
to say that it should have been obvious to a 
trial court that it was committing error . . . . 
The second and somewhat interrelated requirement 
for a finding of plain error is that the error 
affect the substantial rights of the accused, 
i.e., that the error be harmful. 
Id. at 35. According to State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121-22 (Utah 
1989), uin most circumstances, the term 'manifest injustice' [found 
in Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c)] is synonymous with the 'plain error' 
standard expressly provided in Utah Rule of Evidence 103(d) and 
elaborated upon in Eldredge . . . ." 
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The second exception is the catch-all device requiring 
"exceptional" or unusual" circumstances. Archambeau, 820 P. 2d at 
923. This exception acts as a safety device "to make certain that 
manifest injustice does not result from the failure to consider an 
issue on appeal." Id. 
As to the plain error exception in the instant case, the trial 
court committed plain error in the course of sentencing Defendant by 
the obvious failure, once it had granted trial counsel's Motion to 
Withdraw, to appoint new counsel to represent Defendant during the 
remainder of the Sentencing Hearing. 
Based on the exchange between the trial court, appointed trial 
counsel, and Defendant, it should have been obvious to the trial 
court that it was committing error by requiring Defendant to 
represent herself without first appointing new counsel or obtaining 
a valid waiver. See Hamilton, 732 P.2d at 506-07; Casarez, 656 P.2d 
at 1007. That such an error was plain or obvious is supported by 
case law, which holds that "sentencing is a critical stage of a 
criminal proceeding at which a defendant is entitled to the effective 
assistance of counsel." Casarez, 656 P. 2d at 1007. Secondly, the 
failure of the trial court to appoint counsel affected the 
substantial rights of Defendant by depriving Defendant of her 
constitutional right to the assistance of counsel and thereby 
19 
requiring her to involuntarily represent herself in a critical stage 
of the criminal proceedings. 
In addition to the "plain error" exception, the instant case 
presents exceptional or unusual circumstances. Defendant was not 
represented by counsel during the May 23, 1995, Sentencing Hearing. 
Consequently, Defendant, who was pro se litigant, was extremely 
unfamiliar with the constitutional and procedural requirements with 
which the trial court should have complied in the course of 
sentencing. These requirements are of momentous constitutional 
concern. To not consider and correct this matter on appeal would 
result in a great and manifest injustice or harm by failing to 
protect the constitutional right of a litigant who was required, as 
a resulit of the trial court's failures, to represent herself pro se 
during the sentencing hearing. 
In the instant case, during the Sentencing hearing on May 23, 
1995, appointed trial counsel interrupted the trial court at the 
beginning of the hearing and stated, "I can't represent [Defendant] 
and I'm not representing her at this time." (R. 47, lines 21-22, 
Transcript of May 23, 1995, Sentencing Hearing). Trial counsel then 
made a "formal motion" to withdraw as counsel for Defendant, which 
the trial court granted (R. 48, lines 12-16, Transcript of May 23, 
1995, Sentencing Hearing). Shortly thereafter, the trial court, 
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without any inquiry as to the appointment of counsel or the knowing 
and intelligent waiver by Defendant of the constitutional right to 
counsel, stated, "Ms. Martinez, this is the time set for sentencing. 
The recommendation is that you be sentenced to the Utah State Prison 
five years to life. I believe I need more information and what I'm 
proposing is [to] sentence you to the Department of Corrections for 
a 60-day evaluation." (R. 49, lines 9-14, Transcript of May 23, 1995, 
Sentencing Hearing). By so doing, the trial court improperly denied 
Defendant her constitutional right to counsel when it required her to 
proceed at the sentencing hearing pro se. Because of this failure, 
Defendant was deprived of her constitutional right to an advocate who 
could have marshaled commendations and arguments in mitigation of the 
impending sentence imposed. Such commendations and arguments in 
mitigation of incarceration include Defendant's total lack of 
involvement in the juvenile system (see Presentence Investigation 
Report, p. 54) , Defendant's relatively recent involvement in the 
criminal justice system, which also indicates that Defendant does not 
present a danger to society (see Presentence Investigation Report, p. 
4During preparation of Appellant's Brief, counsel became aware 
that the Second District Court Clerk's Office neglected to include 
the Presentence Investigation Report in the record upon transmittal 
of the record to the Utah Court of Appeals. Counsel is in the 
process of supplementing the record. In the interest of expediting 
the appeal, counsel refers to the Presentence Investigation Report by 
page number until such time that the Report is transmitted to the 
Utah Court of Appeals. 
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6), and collateral comments from sources close to Defendant that she 
is a "very good mother" with a problem centered around alcohol and 
drug abuse (see Presentence Investigation Report, pp. 10-11). The 
failure to appoint new counsel also prejudiced Defendant by 
preventing her, as a pro se criminal litigant, from challenging any 
discrepancies in the Presentence Investigation Report as she is 
entitled to pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(6)(a). 
Similarly, in United States v. Daniels, 558 F.2d 122 (2nd Cir. 
1977), a rift developed between trial counsel and Defendant. Id. at 
127. At the outset of sentencing, trial counsel informed the court 
that the defendant did not wish to be represented by counsel at 
sentencing. Id. The defendant confirmed this and asked the trial 
court to appoint new counsel for sentencing, arguing that he had been 
deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Id. While 
the trial court did not specifically relieve counsel, the minutes of 
the hearing revealed that the parties and the trial court acted as 
though counsel no longer represented the defendant. Id. In the 
course of vacating the defendant's sentence and remanding for 
resentencing, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit emphasized that the defendant, for all practical purposes was 
acting without counsel at sentencing. The court further stated that 
the defendant was "prejudiced by the lack of an advocate who could 
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have marshalled" commendations and made arguments in mitigation of 
the judgment to be imposed. Id. At 128. 
In the more recent case of Williams v. State, 600 So. 2d 524 
(Fla. Ct. App. 1992), the defendant moved to dismiss his trial 
counsel, which the trial court granted. Id. at 525. The defendant 
then requested that new counsel be appointed, which the trial court 
denied, reasoning that the defendant had already had two attorneys 
represent him. Id. Although the Florida Court of Appeals 
sympathized with the trial court's "beleaguered" circumstances, it 
held that the trial court improperly denied the defendant of his 
constitutional right to counsel when it required him to proceed 
against his will with the sentencing hearing pro se and remanded the 
case for resentencing. Id. at 525-26. 
Like the aforementioned cases of Daniels and Williams, the trial 
court, in the instant case, required Defendant to represent herself 
at the sentencing hearing pro se. The instant case, however, is more 
egregious inasmuch as Defendant was arguably less knowledgeable and 
familiar with the procedural requirements and rights she was entitled 
to than either of the defendants in Daniels or Williams. 
Furthermore, the trial court, in the instant case, had a duty when 
informed of the conflict between trial counsel and Defendant and the 
subsequent withdrawal of trial counsel, to immediately suspend or 
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continue the sentencing hearing, without further action, until 
Defendant was appropriately represented by counsel. The trial 
court's failure to appoint counsel for the remainder of the May 23, 
1995, Sentencing Hearing, casts doubt upon the justice system and the 
procedural fairness that is to be provided to every defendant in the 
course of criminal proceedings, especially when, as in this case, 
fundamental constitutional rights are involved. Because the trial 
court failed to appoint new counsel and required Defendant to proceed 
with sentencing pro se, Defendant's sentence should be vacated and 
the case remanded for resentencing. Finally, the trial court failed 
in its duty to inquire as to the appointment of new counsel prior to 
proceeding with the sentencing hearing, and it also failed to 
continue the sentencing hearing until Defendant was properly 
represented by new counsel. 
2. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN THE COURSE OF 
SENTENCING DEFENDANT BECAUSE THE ACTIONS OF THE TRIAL 
COURT IN SENTENCING DEFENDANT WERE INHERENTLY UNFAIR 
AND BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER ALL 
LEGALLY RELEVANT FACTORS• 
An appellate court ""will set aside a sentence imposed by the 
trial court if the sentence represents an abuse of discretion, if the 
trial judge fails to consider all legally relevant factors, or if the 
sentence imposed exceeds the limits prescribed by law.'" State v. 
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Gentlewind, 844 P. 2d 372, 375 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting State v. 
Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted)). uAn 
abuse of discretion occurs only when it is ""clear that the actions 
of the judge were . . . inherently unfair.'" State v. Rhodes, 818 
P.2d 1048, 1051 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 
885, 887 (Utah 1978)) . 
In addition to the arguments set forth in this section of the 
Brief, Defendant incorporates the arguments under Defendant's above-
mentioned argument concerning the violation of Defendant's 
constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel during 
sentencing. By failing to appoint m-* counsel for the remainder of 
the May 23, 1995, Sentencing Hearing, the trial court's actions in 
the course of sentencing Defendant were inherently unfair. Such 
conduct on the part of the trial court constitutes ""manifest 
inherent unfairness and injustice, or conduct which offends the 
public sense of fair play.'" See Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 
1978) (quoting Hicklin v. State, 535 P.2d 743, 751 (Wyo. 1975)). 
Further, the record indicates that the trial court failed to 
consider legally relevant factors in the course of sentencing 
Defendant. During the second Sentencing Hearing on July 25, 1995, 
the following exchange took place: 
THE COURT: Is there anything you want to present to 
the Court before I enter sentence in the matter? 
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MR. REDD: Yes, there is. There have been 
applications made while this evaluation was going on 
for programs that would be designed to aid Ms. 
Martinez in making the changes she needs to make in 
her life. One of those places is Parkview. And it is 
an inpatient facility. And she informed me this 
morning that they have accepted her to that program. 
That's an alternat ive that I didn't notice in the 
report. And maybe that information came after the 
report was prepared. But there is an alternative for 
the Court to put her in an inpatient facility where 
she would be responsible and also receive the aid she 
needs. 
And she would be required to remain there. She 
wouldn't have the option of dropping out because she 
would be under the Court's control. And it is her 
desire, and our request therefore, that the Court 
utilize that option rather than the option recommended 
by the report of remaining incarcerated. 
THE COURT: May I just ask, usually Diagnostic checks 
all those programs. And that's a program they 
regularly check. And that's not --
MR. REDD: Well, they are the ones that made the 
recommendation -- the application, helped her with the 
application. It is just that the response of 
acceptance of her into that program apparently has 
come back since the report was prepared. 
THE COURT: Okay. Is there anything else you would 
like to present to the Court? 
MR. REDD: She would like to make a statement. 
MS. MARTINEZ: I would just like to say I would like 
a chance to go to Parkview and see if I can get my 
life together there, and get my family back together. 
And that's about all I have to say. 
THE COURT: Okay, I think in terms of the report, the 
recommendation is that they felt that there had to be 
a long term program. I am not sure -- I am familiar 
with Parkview. I don't think -- it is not long term, 
26 
about two or three months. I don't think it is a long 
term program. I think the Court feels given the 
review and the 60 day diagnostic, the Court is going 
to follow the recommendation of the Department of 
Corrections. And that is, to the charge of aggravated 
assault, a felony of the first degree, the Defendant 
is going to be sentenced to the Utah State Prison for 
an indeterminate period of five years to life; 
$1,250.00 fine, plus a surcharge of 85 percent; there 
will be no firearm enhancement or anything with the 
sentence in this program. 
Now, if you would like to appeal the sentence the 
Court has entered, you must make the appeal within 3 0 
days. 
MR. REDD: Your Honor, there is one other item, if I 
could mention it to the Court. 
Okay. 
MR. REDD: We notice in the report that there is 
significance applied to the fact that Ms. Martinez 
does not acknowledge pulling out the gun, pointing it 
at the victim, and such things as that. And quite a 
bit of credence is placed on her not making the 
changes she needs to make by her taking that posture. 
And we are very concerned about that. 
She has adamantly maintained that didn't happen. 
And the only evidence that I am aware of that is from 
the victim, who has a record that certainly is more 
horrendous than hers as far as believability. Yet the 
people who are working with her seem to insist that 
she acknowledge conduct that she says she didn't 
commit. And if that's one of the roadblocks in making 
the progress they want her to make, I don't know how 
we get around that. 
THE COURT: I think it may be well then if you want to 
write a letter to the program people as her counsel 
and explain that, and explain the circumstances, it 
may be appropriate to do that. I think that's the 
best way to address that. 
(R. 65-67, Transcript of July 25, 1995, Sentencing Hearing). 
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As evidenced by the aforementioned part of the record, the trial 
court failed to consider and clarify whether the Parkview alternative 
treatment program met the qualifications for a long term program 
pursuant to the recommendation and assistance of the Department of 
Corrections (see R. 65, lines 7-12 and 20-24, Transcript of July 25, 
1995, Sentencing Hearing). By failing to clarify whether the 
Parkview treatment facility is a long term program sufficient for the 
needs of Defendant in the treatment of her alcohol and drug abuse, 
the trial court failed to consider relevant factors in the course of 
sentencing Defendant. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(6)(a) provides, in relevant part: 
Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence 
investigation report, which have not been 
resolved by the parties and the department prior 
to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention 
of the sentencing judge, and the judge may grant 
an additional ten working days to resolve the 
alleged inaccuracies of the report with the 
department. If after ten working days the 
inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall 
make a determination of relevance and accuracy 
on the record. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-404(1) (b) (ii) states that "[a]ny diagnostic 
evaluation report ordered by the court is supplemental to and becomes 
a part of the presentence investigation report." 
At the Sentencing Hearing on July 25, 1995, Defendant's trial 
counsel brought to the court's attention the discrepancy concerning 
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whether or not Defendant actually pulled the gun and pointed it at 
the victim in the course of the events serving as a basis for the 
aggravated robbery charge (R. 66-67, Transcript of July 25, 1995, 
Sentencing Hearing). The trial court failed to resolve this 
discrepancy in the manner set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-
1(6) (a), which requires the trial court, in the event that the matter 
cannot be resolved between the parties, to make a determination of 
relevance and accuracy on the record. Such a determination is 
critical not only to the sentence imposed but to the remainder of 
Defendant's involvement with the correctional system, including the 
Board of Pardons. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant respectfully asks that the 
Court vacate her sentence and remand the case for resentencing so 
that Defendant might have the opportunity to be represented by 
counsel during sentencing and so the trial court might consider all 
legally relevant factors in the course of imposing sentence. 
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
AND METHOD OF DISPOSITION 
Defendant requests oral argument because oral argument will 
materially enhance the decisional process due to the significant 
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issues in the instant appeal dealing with the constitutional right to 
the assistance of counsel at the critical stage of sentencing, which 
is a matter of continuing public interest and involves issues 
requiring further development in the area of criminal law. Counsel 
for Defendant further requests that the method of disposition of the 
instant appeal be by opinion designated by the Court "For Official 
Publication" for purposes of precedential value in future cases. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /Un) day of February, 1996. 
JREN, ARNOLD & WIGGINS, L.C. 
Wiggi 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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